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TAKEOVER: GERMAN REUNIFICATION
UNDER A MAGNIFYING GLASS

Mathias Reimann*
THE I MPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GER
UNIFICATION. By Peter E. Quint. Princeton: Princeton Uni
versity Press. 1997. Pp. xi, 482. $75.
MAN

My first personal experience with the unification of my home
country was an unlikely encounter in an unlikely place. In July
1990, I was strolling across the Ponte Vecchio in Florence when I
saw something so bizarre that it stopped me in my tracks. At the
southern end of the bridge, deep in the pedestrian zone - off limits
to automobiles - and right in the middle of the tourist crowd, was
a lonely car, occupied by four obviously disoriented people. It was
not just any car but a small, drab, and amusingly antiquated vehicle
puffing bluish smoke from a whining two-stroke engine. I barely
trusted my eyes: it was a "Trabbi,"1 the standard-issue East Ger
man automobile.
At this moment, I realized that the political landscape of Eu
rope as I had known it no longer existed. In the world in which I
grew up, citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were
not allowed to drive out of Eastern Europe, and they did not have
the Western currency to pay for such an adventure. There were
simply no "Trabbis" on this side of the iron curtain. But in the pre
vious fall, the Berlin wall had come down suddenly and, just a few
days before my encounter in Florence, West German currency had
been introduced in the GDR. Apparently these East Germans
grabbed the first Deutschmarks available, jammed into their tiny
car, drove across the previously impassable border, and braved the
high-speed race on Western freeways in their hopelessly un
derpowered vehicle to make a dream come true: to drive to Italy
and see a world they knew only from postcards.
As I watched these visitors from another world struggling to
find a way out of their predicament, I understood that complete
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan and University of Trier, Germany. Dr. iur.
1982, University of Freiburg; LL.M. 1983, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. "Trabbi" is a nickname for Trabant {"Satellite"). For decades, the Trabant was one of
only two models of cars made by the German Democratic Republic {GDR) that were avail
able to the average East German consumer. With the exception of a few East European
models, foreign cars were by and large unavailable. Technologically 40 years behind Western
automobiles, it became a cultural symbol of the former GDR in the period after
reunification.
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unification would only be a matter of time. In the end, it came
much more quickly than most people deemed possible.
I.

A NATION

REUNITED

Peter Quint's The Imperfect Union2 describes and analyzes how,
after forty-one years of separation, the two Germanies became one
again. The story began to unfold almost a decade ago and has since
become part of history. In order to understand what the book is
about, it will be helpful to summarize briefly the major events.3
In the late 1980s, the econoinic and political crisis in Eastern
Europe accelerated and deepened. As glasnost took hold and the
USSR began to crumble, President Gorbachev informed the East
German government that it could no longer depend on support
from its Inighty ally and would have to survive on its own. At this
point, many GDR citizens sensed a historic opportunity to escape
the communist regime. In late summer of 1989, in several Eastern
European countries, East Germans attempted to break out by occu
pying West German embassies - including the one in East Berlin
- requesting that they be taken to the West. On September 11,
Hungary punched a hole in the iron curtain through which East
Germans could escape when it· broke rank with the Warsaw Pact
states and opened its border with Austria. So many took advantage
of the opportunity that the resulting hemorrhage threatened the
very survival of the GDR.
At the same time, within the country itself, opposition to the
communist regime took to the streets. The official celebrations of
the GDR's 40th anniversary in the fall of 1989 prompted mass dem
onstrations against the government. Without backing from the So
viet Union, the regime did not dare quell the uprising and decided
to yield. On October 18, long-time ruler Erich Honecker resigned
and was replaced by the more moderate and reforinist Egon Krenz.
Yet, it turned out that all efforts to save the GDR - mocked by
English speakers as the "Gradually Disappearing Republic" - in
its current form had come too late. Desperately trying to relieve
the mounting public pressure, the Krenz government opened the
Berlin Wall late on the night of November 9, 1989. As East
Germans flooded into the West, one huge celebration engulfed the
whole city of Berlin.
At this point, however, even among the Germans, few expected
imininent reunification. In fact, it seemed likely that the GDR
·

2. Peter Quint is the Jacob A. France Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of
Maryland.
3. The following summary is largely my own. Peter Quint recounts the most important
events at various places in the book, most notably in chapter 3, pp. 15-21, chapter 7, pp. 5664, and chapter 8, pp. 65-72.

1990

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1988

would survive for quite some time, albeit as a much more liberal
and democratic state (pp. 19-20, 28). In December 1989, a "Round
Table" of GDR leaders and public figures formed and began to
work on constitutional reform, some members envisioning a com
pletely new GDR constitution. Several measures gradually intro
ducing democracy and pluralism were actually enacted in the
following months (pp. 28-46).

It was not until February and March 1990 that complete reunifi
cation was considered a serious possibility. This turning of the tide
was supported by two generally parallel developments. One took
place within the GDR. On March 18, the first free election of the
Volkskammer, the East German parliament, was held. It was won
by the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), which had governed the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) under Chancellor Helmut
Kohl since 1982. This outcome demonstrated that the majority of
the GDR population wanted unification with the FRG (p. 20). The
new GDR government under Prime Minister Lothar de Maziere
was a strangely ambivalent regime. On the one hand, it was the
first - and last - freely elected GDR administration; on the other
hand, it was largely dependent on its Western sister party, Kohl's
CDU. Both parts of Germany were now essentially governed by
the same party, the leadership of which pushed hard towards actual
reunification.
The second crucial development took place on the international
level. In the spring of 1990, the Soviet leadership, itself under enor
mous economic and political pressure, indicated that it might toler
ate German reunification. To be sure, such tolerance would come
at a price. The Soviet government expected not only important
political concessions but also considerable financial aid from Ger
many. Nevertheless, the path to unification was suddenly open and
both German governments proceeded rapidly.
On May 18, 1990, the FRG and the GDR signed the Treaty of
Economic Union. When it took effect on July 1, the GDR began
switching over to a Western capitalist market economy and intro
duced the Deutschmark as its official currency (pp. 56-64). Shops
offering Western consumer goods sprang up almost overnight, and
four adventurous GDR citizens embarked on a journey to Florence.
Only a few weeks later, on August 23, 1990, the Volkskammer
voted for the GDR to accede to the Federal Republic.4 On August
31, representatives of both States signed the Unification Treaty. It
was quickly ratified by both legislatures.
In the meantime, the Two-Plus-Four negotiations, between the
two German states and the four World War II allies, advanced to4. As to the manner of unification - that is, accession of the GDR to the FRG
infra Part III.

-
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ward the renunciation of the rights that the allies still had with re
gard to' Germany and, especially, Berlin. On September 12, after
the principal players, the West German and Soviet governments,
had reached agreement on the crucial issues, the Two-Plus-Four
Treaty was signed. It provided for German reunification, accorded
Germany full sovereignty,.and thus finally closed the post-World
War II period in Europe (pp. 268-76).
The Unification Treaty between the FRG and the GDR took
effect on October 3, 1990.· On that day, the German Democratic
Republic ceased to exist as it merged into the Federal Republic of
Germany. At the same time, the newly reunited country, now com
prising sixteen instead of eleven states and reaching from the Rhine
to the Oder, became the largest and most populous nation in West
ern Europe.
Yet, soon after the celebrations ended, it became obvious that
reunification was also an enormous burden and presented stagger
ing problems. Who was fit to remain - or become - a judge, ad
ministrator, or professor in the East? Who was going to own what
property? Who could be prosecuted for which political crimes?
Who was going to be spared or even rehabilitated? What ought to
happen to the files of the Stasi, the East German secret service that
had spied on its own citizens? What must be done to repair the
desolate Eastern infrastructure and revive the moribund Eastern
economy? And last, but not least, how would the bills be paid?
II.

A DEFINITIVE ACCOUNT

The Imperfect Union, which grew out of a long article,5 presents
both a narrative of the reunification process and a discussion of its
most significant problems and consequences. Its twenty-four chap
ters are grouped into three major parts. Part I covers the develop
ments within the GDR from the revolution through unification that is, the one-year transition period from the fall of 1989 through
November 1990. Part II examines the West German government's
endeavor to extend the FRG's political, economic, administrative,
and judicial structures. to the former GDR. Finally, Part III ad
dresses the international context of reunification - the issues con
cerning the European Union and NATO as well as the role of the
reunited Germany in European and world politics. At first glance,
this last part is somewhat surprising, but it turns out to be an essen
tial and integral element of the whole picture. The intra-German
events, we learn, were part of the continuing transformation of
5. See Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REv. 475
(1991).
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Europe, marked by the dissolution of the Eastern bloc as well as
the integration and widening of the European Union.
The coverage of the book is much broader than the subtitle,
suggests. It is not
limited to constitutional law and development at all. As Quint
points out, he construes the term constitution broadly, as "ex
tending to important international arrangements that help define
the nature of a state, as well as certain central statutes, regulations,
and practices that give concrete meaning to the underlying princi
ples of a political system" (p. 6). Yet even this description is too
narrow because the book is really an account of the unification pro
cess as a whole, albeit with a strong emphasis on constitutional and
other legal issues. It considers the historical and political back
ground, discusses social and economic aspects, and even touches on
psychological and emotional dimensions. The result is a rich and
colorful picture that captivates the legal academic but is also rele
vant to scholars from other disciplines and may actually interest an
educated lay audience.

Constitutional Structures of German Unification,

The book has three particular strengths. First, it manages to
present a detailed and accurate narrative in a very clear and reada
ble fashion. There are a thousand trees, but there is also the whole
forest. Thus, the book makes the complex process of German unifi
cation intelligible without simplifying it. Second, The Imperfect
Union provides thoughtful discussions of the major issues. Every
chapter is an essay in its own right, focusing on specific aspects
ranging from constitutional problems to property issues and from
the divisive abortion question to the restructuring of the adminis
trative and judicial systems. Many of Quint's analyses are subtle
and thought provoking. Chapter Fourteen, for example, which
deals with the prosecution of former GDR leaders and officials,
summ arizes and weighs the major arguments in a few dense and
perceptive paragraphs (p. 215). Finally, the book is critical but not
partisan. Its criticism is always careful and mostly restrained; it be
comes vociferous only where appropriate.6 As a result, Quint pro
vides the reader with plenty of food for thought but leaves ample
room to form one's own judgment.
As a German reader, my initial reaction is amazement that an
outsider could have written such an insightful book. But perhaps it
is the very detachment of the outsider that enables Quint to capture
the story and the issues with so much acumen and sympathy and in
such an open-minded and balanced fashion.7 With many books, the
6. See, e.g., pp. 148-51, 164, 290.
7. This may also be true for Inga Markovits' account of the dissolution and rebuilding of
the East German judiciary. See INGA MAru<ovrrs, IMPERFECT JusnCE: AN EAST-WEST
GERMAN DIARY (1995).
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price of such detachment is a lack of familiarity, an inability to cap
ture the subtleties of tone and color, or a failure to achieve deeper
understanding, but The Imperfect Union does not suffer from these
deficiencies. This is probably because Quint spent considerable
time in Germany during the critical period. He drew his informa
tion not only from printed sources but also from talks with the peo
ple involved in the ongoing events and from personal impressions
and observations (p. ix).
.
In sum, The Imperfect Union is a very good book. It promises,
and deserves, to become the definitive account of the legal and in
stitutional aspects of German reunification. It certainly has no
equal in English.8 Even in German, there is, at present, only an
assortment. of detailed analyses of particular aspects of reunifica
tion9 but no equally comprehensive study. In fact, it would be
worthwhile to translate The Imperfect Union into German.

As a reviewer, one feels obliged not only to praise but also to
criticize. Thus, I should point out that The Imperfect Union is not a
brilliant book. Yet, it does not try to be. Its goal is limited, but by
no means modest: it promises to present an accurate account and
profound analysis of German reunification, and it fulfills that prom
ise admirably. A few more details, such as a chronological table of
events, would be very useful to have, particularly for foreign read
ers and as memories fade. In the end, however, the only true disap
pointment is the book's Conclusion (pp. 311-15), which merely
summarizes some of the material presented. It provides no general
synthesis and no final perspective. This is a pity because Quint
shows in many other contexts that he is capable of weaving differ
ent strands together and extracting the fundamental questions as
well as the possible answers from the complexity of the events. In
the final chapter, however, he leaves the reader wondering whether
there are any general themes that pervade the whole story.
III.

How

THE

EAST WAs WoN

Such pervasive themes do in fact exist. The most important one
is the basic manner in which German unification was pursued and
accomplished. To understand this manner, it is necessary to con
sider the challenges and the choices that presented themselves to
the governments at the time.
8. As far as I can see, the only competitor is RYsZARD W. P10TRow1cz & SAM K.N.
BLAY, THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW (1997). It is
a much shorter and more black-letter account, more useful for quick reference than for
deeper reflection.
9. In particular, see the five-volume DEUTSCHE WIEDERVEREINIGUNG: DIE REcHTS
EINHEIT (Klaus Stem ed., 1991-1993).
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The fundamental challenge was to merge two very different
countries. After four decades of membership in opposing Euro
pean blocs, the two Germanies had different political, constitu
tional, and legal systems; different administrative and educational
structures; different economies; and different societies. The FRG
was a fairly democratic state with a multiparty system and a liberal
constitution committed to the rule of law. It sported a capitalist
economy and a pluralist society. Its marketplace was driven by
competition and demanded performance. Potential material re
wards were high, but so were stress and anxiety levels. The welfare
system was strong, but there were growing problems with unem
ployment, homelessness, vandalism, and crime. In contrast, the
GDR was a decidedly undemocratic, almost dictatorial, regime with
a single-party monopoly, sham elections, a practically meaningless
constitution, and a legal system under the thumb of the Party.10 It
had a planned socialist economy and a rather uniform society with
only small differences in wealth. Satisfaction with material living
conditions was low, but so was stress. The social system was more
highly developed than in the West, virtually guaranteeing everyone
a job, a roof over the head, and the basic means of existence. Of
course, these different environments conditioned their inhabitants
in psychologically different ways. They bred different attitudes to
ward the state and politics, the constitution and law, and public au
thority and private property. Last but not least, they also made
individuals view each other in different ways - in the West rather
like competitors and strangers (that is, with considerable distrust),
while in the East more as fellow sufferers (that is, with solidarity).
In uniting these two different countries, there were, in principle,
two options. The first was to create a new Germany, with each for
mer part contributing whatever worthwhile elements it had to offer.
The result would be a society built on compromise, a middle ground
on which the citizens from both sides could meet. The second op
tion was simply to extend West Germany eastward. The FRG
would thus survive more or less unchanged, while the GDR would
be wiped out, swallowed up by the West. The result would be a
country characterized by decidedly Western values, lifestyles, and
challenges to which Eastern citizens would have to adjust. The
choice between these two options was as inevitable as it was
fundamental.
10. For a description of the GDR legal system, see DANIEL C. MEADOR, IMPRESSIONS OF
LAW IN EAST GERMANY (1986). For a perceptive analysis of the Eastern conceptions of
rights and law, see Inga Markovits, Law or Order - Constitutionalism and Legality in East
ern Europe, 34 STAN. L. REv. 513 (1982); Inga Markovits, Pursuing One's Rights Under So
cialism, 38 STAN. L. REv. 689 (1986); Inga Markovits, Socialist vs. Bourgeois Rights - An
East-West German Comparison, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1978).
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In the end, the politicians in charge chose the second option. To
some extent, the triumph of the West was a foregone conclusion.
Virtually nobody wanted to preserve the Eastern style of govern
ment, single-party system, sham constitution, or planned economy.
Yet, abandoning these features did not necessarily require whole
sale endorsement of the current Western model, with both its
strengths and its weaknesses. It would have been possible to draft a
new, common constitution, to rewrite laws with a view to compro
mise, to consider new economic models, and to work toward a soci
ety in which both Westerners and Easterners might feel at home.
Even in the West, voices called for such a course of renewal and
compromise.11 But according to the course pursued by the West
German CDU leadership, the new nation would not emerge from a
mutual adjustment between its two former parts. There would be
only a larger Federal Republic of Germany. A careful reader of
The Imperfect Union will note that this choice characterized the
whole unification process, for better or worse.
The choice was most starkly presented, and is most easily dis
cernible, on the constitutional level (pp. 47-55). In 1949, when the
division of Germany became clear, the FRG's Grundgesetz (Basic
Law), drafted as a temporary constitution for the new republic, ex
pressly endorsed future reunification in its preamble. The docu
ment listed two options to accomplish that goal.12 On the one hand,
article 146 provided that "this Basic Law will lose its validity on the
effective date of a constitution that has been chosen by the German
people in a free decision."13 Thus, it seemed to envisage the draft
ing of a new constitution on the occasion of reunification. On the
other hand, article 23 provided that the Basic Law was to be
adopted "in other parts of Germany after their accession [to the
FRG]."14 In other words, the Basic Law could simply be extended
to newly incorporated territory. The relationship between these
two options was never settled with finality. Indeed, even the ques-

11. See, e.g., JENS REICH, ROcKKEHR NACH EUROPA: BERICHT ZUR NEUEN LAGE DER
DEUTSCHEN NATION (1991); EINE VERFASSUNG FOR DEUTSCHLAND (Bernd Guggenberger et
al. eds., 1991).
12. In contrast, the GDR constitution of 1968, as revised in 1974, envisaged the division
of Germany as final and thus did not provide for unification at all. P. 48.
13. The translation is taken from The Imperfect Union, p. 49. After reunification, Article
146 was redrafted.
14. Article 23 in its original version has since become obsolete. After reunification, and
after Germany's renunciation of all claims to the territory east of the Oder and Neisse (now
Poland), there are no parts left to accede. Tue text of Article 23 thus has been replaced with
a completely different provision dealing with the role of Germany in the European Union.
See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 23 (F.R.G.).
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tion as to whether article 146 required a new constitution upon uni
fication remained open.is
As a matter of fact, German reunification took place via article
23. East Germany acceded to the FRG. Theoretically, the FRG
had no choice but to accept the accession (pp. 52-53), but in reality
the choice was, of course, made by the political leadership of both
states. The consequences of choosing the path of article 23 were
extremely far-reaching. To begin with, there would be no new con
stitution for the reunited Germany and thus no constitutional com
promise of any sort. Instead, the FRG's Basic Law simply became
the constitution of the East. Even more important, however, was
the effect on the subconstitutional level. As the GDR dissolved
into the FRG, Western law suddenly applied in the Eastern states
(pp. 108-10). Overnight, eighteen million former GDR citizens
found themselves governed by a legal regime of which they knew
next to nothing and which fit many of their needs poorly at best.
Property rights in the East were suddenly determined by Western
law (pp. 124, 151); the civil service, the judiciary, and the universi
ties had to be reorganized according to Western principles (pp. 167,
182); and even the East's newly drafted state constitutions had to
conform to the Basic Law (pp. 82, 87). It is true that the Unifica
tion Treaty addressed many of the problems of transition, providing
interim solutions and gradual adjustment in several areas. But in
the end, Eastern legal, administrative, and institutional structures
were still replaced by those of the West. As a result, there was vir
tually no mutual adjustment, harmonization of laws, or preservation
of the considerable social advantages which some GDR law - for
example, in the area of domestic relations - had offered (p. 109).
Peter Quint clearly and accurately describes the overt extension
of Western constitutional principles, legal rules, and institutional
structures into the GDR. Yet, The Imperfect Union penetrates
more deeply into the character of the unification process. It shows
that "the spirit of article 23" triumphed over "the spirit of article
146" (pp. 82, 87) on a much broader scale. In virtually every re
gard, the FRG government, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, pur
sued a policy of rapid and radical Westernization of the East,
stubbornly rejecting a course of mutual adjustment, compromise, or
reform. illustrations of this approach abound. In February and
March of 1990, Western political parties and party politics already
had taken over East German election campaigns, marginalizing or
eliminating the grassroots organizations and citizens' alliances that
had carried the 1989 revolution (pp. 40-41). Soon thereafter, bu15. At least theoretically, there was a third option, namely the formation of a more or
less loose confederation between the two countries for a transition period. As Quint points
out, this idea was quickly abandoned. Pp. 47-48.
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reaucrats in Western ministries drafted the Treaty of Economic
Union and the Unification Treaty - documents of vast importance
for the future of the country - with very little Eastern input. The
treaties were then presented to the parliaments for ratification on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.16 The vast issues of real property rights
lost through communist expropriation or by emigrants from the
GDR were settled very much in favor of Western interests (pp. 12353). Much to the detriment of the Eastern economy, Eastern pro
duction facilities were sold off or liquidated hastily, according to
Western market principles (pp. 144-53). The civil service, the judi
ciary, and the universities were restructured to conform with the
Western model, entailing the replacement of the majority of East
ern personnel by imports from the West.17 In all these matters, and
others too numerous to mention, the former GDR was reshaped
according to what Quint calls the "conservative tradition" (p. 4),
that is, the political and social program of the conservative Chris
tian Democratic government in the West. To add insult to injury,
many of these measures were implemented by Western officials in a
patronizing style and with little or no regard for Eastern concerns.
Perhaps the only area in which a true compromise was sought,
and found by the legislature, was that of abortion. First trimester
termination of pregnancies had been legal in the GDR, but largely
illegal in the FRG. After reunification and lengthy debates, the all
German Bundestag enacted a liberal compromise that essentially
legalized first trimester abortions. Yet, the Constitutional Court
struck down important parts of this compromise as incompatible
with the court's own highly conservative interpretation of the Basic
Law.18 Even here, the Western model ultimately prevailed, depriv
ing East German women of much of the freedom of choice they had
enjoyed (pp. 154-65).
By and large, however, the Constitutional Court softened the
blows the East had to suffer. Many fundamental issues came before
the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the form of constitutional ques
tions. Time and again, the court interfered with the often ruthless
pursuit of Western interests and thus decelerated the Westerniza
tion of the East. It struck down the new election law as patently
unfair to Eastern parties (pp. 68-69), required more compensation
for lost property than the government had been willing to pay (pp.
137-38), provided the East Germans who lost their jobs in the pub16. See pp. 57, 104-05. Tue drafting took place behind closed doors and without any
public discourse. Pp. 57, 104-05. As far as I know, submitting these fundamental documents
to a popular referendum was never even seriously considered.
17. See pp. 166-93; MARKovrrs, supra note 7; see also Inga Markovits, Children of a
Lesser God: GDR Lawyers in Post-Socialist Germany, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2270 (1996).
18. ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerf GE] [Federal Consti
tutional Court] 88 (1993), 203 (F.R.G.).
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lie sector with at least some protection (pp. 169-71, 175-76), and
limited the government's right to prosecute former East German
spies (pp. 213-14)
FRG citizens who had spied in the GDR were
of course not prosecuted. Thus, Quint rightly sees the Court as a
mediator between Western and Eastern interests. Only the abor
tion decision does not fit that pattern.19
-

Notwithstanding the Court's insistence on compromise in most
of the cases before it, Western structures, models, and interests pre
vailed on an overwhelming scale. It is therefore somewhat mislead
ing to speak of the "reunification" of the two countries. The term
suggests a merger to which both parts cont ribute. Almost nothing
of that sort occurred. A much more appropriate, and much more
honest, term for what actually happened is "takeover." The FRG
simply took over the GDR, just as one corporation takes over
another.20
IV.

THE IMPERFECT UNION

In principle, there is nothing wrong with takeovers, especially
when they are the result of necessity. Indeed, the political course
chosen by the German government has often been justified on the
ground that it was the only way to get the job done. There is much
to be said for this assertion. Extending Western structures east ward
was undoubtedly the simplest, fastest, and surest way of accom
plishing unification. This approach treated the whole problem as
one of effective management, and it required little thought beyond
the solution of technical matters.
Yet takeovers come at a cost. Although the reshaping of East
ern legal, judicial, and administrative structures according to the
Western model has succeeded on a technical level, it has also en
raged millions of East Germans who became frustrated with a new
order that they did not understand and that cared little for their
particular concerns. Similarly, the shock therapy applied to t he
Eastern economy, exposing it to market forces with next-to-no ad
justment period, has turned out to be a massive failure, resulting in
the loss of almost half of all jobs (pp. 148-49). Almost a decade
later, unemployment continues to be as high as productivity is low.
These takeover costs are borne by the citizens in both parts of Ger
many. The East has suffered high human costs; many citizens have
failed to make the necessary transition and continue to feel lost in
19. Quint is somewhat ambivalent on that point. He sees the Constitutional Court's
abortion decision as yet another compromise, pp. 160, 163-64, but also admits that it "re
mains quite far from a full recognition of the position reflected in the 1972 GDR statute," p.
163.
20. The takeover was "friendly" because the GDR government cooperated. Although
the Eastern government actually voted for unification, it is highly questionable whether it
would have supported in all regards the manner in which unification ultimately took place.
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the new, competitive environment. In the West, the costs are pri
marily :financial; Western taxpayers continue to pour billions of
Deutschmarks into an East that looks more and more like a bot
tomless pit. All this creates much mutual resentment and aliena
tion. The wall in Berlin is gone but the "wall in the head" has by
and large remained (p. 3). East and West will eventually grow to
gether, but for the foreseeable future, their union will continue to
be imperfect.
It is thereforeopen to doubt whether unification, takeover-style,
was the more prudent choice. But would a policy of mutual adjust
ment and compromise have yielded better results? As with all such
questions, there is no definite answer. Yet, one thing is clear: to
reject such a policy meant to forego a historic opportunity to re
think the premises on which the West was built and to reform Ger
many - constitutionally, economically, and socially.
Unfortunately, the political leadership lacked the will to rethink
anything or to undertake any meaningful reform, even on a modest
scale.21 In recent years, the consequences of this reluctance have
become increasingly obvious as German voter frustration with ossi
fied party politics grows, as the social system is subjected to mount
ing pressure, and as the economy limps along.
When all is said and done, therefore, German reunification is
not only a success story but also one of missed opportunities. It was
not only a great victory for Western democracy and market capital
ism but also a costly defeat for the idea of critical reflection and the
spirit of reform. Thus, upon closing The Imperfect Union, the
reader is left both fascinated by the events and saddened by the
stubborn conservatism and lack of imagination of the politicians
and bureaucrats who orchestrated the takeover of the East.

21. When the government created a commission in 1992 to undertake constitutional revi
sions for the postunification age, it handed the job over to career politicians and bureaucrats.
Unsurprisingly, the revision came to almost naught. Pp. 115-23.
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